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Abstract 
If permanent output is uncertain, tax smoothing can be perilous: both debt levels and tax 
rates are difficult to stabilize and may drift upwards. One practical remedy would be to 
target the debt. However, our simulations confirm that such a policy would require un-
desirably volatile fiscal adjustments and may inhibit countercyclical borrowing. An alter-
native would be to link the primary surplus not only to the debt ratio (like tax smoothing) 
but also to its volatility, thus preempting further adjustments while gradually reducing 
the debt. 
1. Introduction 
According to a recent report by the International Monetary Fund’s Indepen-
dent Evaluation Office (IMF/IEO; International Monetary Fund, 2003), fiscal com-
ponents  of  Fund  programs  are  typically  plagued  by  erroneous  (often  optimistic) 
output forecasts.
1 In addition, the report suggested that the magnitude of an initial 
fiscal adjustment was often not clearly justified in terms of long-run fiscal debt sus-
tainability, and the rationale for subsequent program revisions is often unclear. 
Most  would  agree  that  the goal  of  a well-intentioned  policy  adviser  (from 
the Fund or elsewhere) should be to design a fiscal policy that is sustainable in 
the long run but not excessively harsh during temporary downturns. Regarding the latt-
er criteria, the use of automatic fiscal stabilizers, including borrowing over the busi-
ness cycle, is generally regarded to be desirable: if a government is permitted to 
borrow during downturns, it may be able to reduce the volatility of tax rates, expen-
ditures, and aggregate activity. 
Moreover, given the uncertainties surrounding output growth, designing such 
a fiscal policy is a daunting task. To successfully borrow during economic downturns, 
a government needs to do more than simply adhere to Rogoff’s (2003) common-sense 
admonition to save during upturns. Such a policy requires that the government esti-
*  This  paper  was  adapted  from  an  IMF  working  paper.  It  should  not  be  interpreted  as  representing 
the views of the IMF or the World Bank. The views expressed in paper are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent those of the IMF, the World Bank or the policies of either institution.  
**  E. Tanner  (corresponding  author)  is  a  Senior  Economist  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  Division  of
the IMF Institute; K. Carey is a Senior Country Economist for the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries,
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  Region.  We  acknowledge  useful  comments  by  Eza  Al-Zein,  Adolfo 
Barajas, Luis Catão, Enzo Croce, Mercedes da Costa, Lennart Erickson, Hugo Juan-Ramón, André San-
tos, and Irina Yakadina. Special thanks are due to Jacques Miniane, who shared his knowledge of
learning models. All remaining errors are our responsibility. 
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mate permanent output – explicitly or implicitly – since the government’s spending 
capacity is determined by the permanent (not current) tax base. 
The quality of permanent output forecasts may depend on the technical exper-
tise or the underlying intentions of the policymaker. Alternatively, permanent output 
may be characterized by unpredictable, persistent shocks. In this case, forecast errors 
for permanent output are an inherent feature of the output process itself, not a re-
flection the fiscal authority’s expertise or intentions. 
What are the implications for debt outcomes when it is difficult to forecast 
permanent output? To address this question, we consider several alternative fiscal 
rules in an environment where output shocks are partly composed of a permanent 
(random-walk) component. Importantly, the government is unable to distinguish be-
tween permanent and temporary components. However, the government knows that 
both kinds of shocks are normally distributed, the mean of both kinds of shocks is 
zero, and it knows the variances of both kinds of shocks (both absolutely and relative 
to one another). Thus, an informational imperfection arises from the fact that the go-
vernment  cannot  distinguish  between  permanent  and  temporary  shocks.  That  is, 
the government  faces  a “signal  extraction”  problem  similar  to  one  originally  pro-
posed by Muth (1960) (see also (Harvey, 1989), and (Miniane, 2004)). 
A recurrent theme in this paper is that of a fiscal objective function. McCal-
lum  (2000)  and  others  have  suggested  that  a rules-based  policy  regime  reflects 
the maximization by the authority of an objective function with a time-invariant (not 
period-by-period) perspective. This echoes Lucas (1976) and Kydland and Prescott 
(1977),  who  advocate  rules  with  “good  operating  characteristics [ … ]  ( t h a t  a r e )  
simple and easily understood, so it is obvious when a policy maker deviates from 
the policy”. 
Our benchmark regime resembles the tax smoothing model proposed by Barro 
(1979). The essential element of such a policy is that rates are optimally aligned one- 
-to-one  with  total  expenditures  (primary  plus  interest).  Such  a regime  closely  re-
sembles the canonical debt sustainability framework widely used by policy makers 
(see (Blanchard et al., 1990), (Burnside, 2005, Ch. 3)); it is often interpreted to also 
be a debt stabilization framework (International Monetary Fund, 2003b).  
This  framework  uses  a common-sense  analogy  with  the permanent  income 
hypothesis of consumer behavior (one that Barro himself emphasized). As in Sar-
gent’s (1987, pp. 385–88) extension to Barro’s (1979) framework, the deadweight 
losses of taxation are reflected in a linear quadratic collection cost function.
2 Since 
primary  expenditures  are  exogenous,  tax  rates  respond  to  permanent c h a n g e s  i n  
the public budgetary burden. If output shocks are temporary, governments should 
borrow over the business cycle rather than adjust taxes, and government debt opti-
mally fluctuates countercyclically around a deterministic mean.  
However,  our  analysis  reveals  that  it  can  be  difficult  to  stabilize  either 
the debt ratio or the tax rate if there are permanent shocks to output. Instead, under 
2 The idea of tax smoothing continues to receive attention in the optimal fiscal policy literature; see, for 
example (Kingston, 1991), (Lloyd-Ellis, Zhan, Zhu, 2005), and (Fisher, Kingston, 2005). Other recent 
papers that use a loss function to approximate underlying consumer welfare include Benigno and Wood-
ford (2003) and Angeletos (2003). By contrast, a paper that directly maximizes consumer utility is Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe (1994); they also introduce large capital levies in an initial period to raise consumer 
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a tax smoothing regime, fiscal policy takes on the unpredictable flavor described in 
the IMF/IEO report: both tax rates and debt ratios can be volatile and may even drift 
upward from their initial values over time. Such unpredictability relates to “debt in-
tolerance” discussed by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003): even at low levels 
of debt, markets may have difficulties distinguishing permanent from transitory fluc-
tuations in the debt ratio, and they may doubt that a required adjustment will take 
place.  
For a fiscal authority that faces such difficulties, we consider two remedies. 
First, we consider a debt targeting (DT) regime similar to one found in the European 
Union and elsewhere: the fiscal authority adjusts the primary surplus (taxes) when 
there is a permanent gap between the desired and actual level of debt. As our simu-
lations confirm, such a regime will stabilize the debt, but at the expense of more tax 
volatility.  
Second, we incorporate a precautionary element into fiscal policy: the pri-
mary surplus is linked not only to the level of debt (as under tax smoothing), but also 
to  the variability  of  the debt  ratio.
3  If  the variability  of  the tax  burden  rises, 
the authority optimally increases the primary surplus. Beneath such a rule lies an ob-
jective to avoid future fiscal adjustments for all but the most unfavorable circum-
stances (not unlike a value-at-risk approach). For illustrative purposes, we consider 
a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)/hyperbolic objective function, extending 
the representative consumer analogy, following Caballero’s (1990) work on precau-
tionary  saving.  An objective  function  of  this  nature  is  consistent  with  recent  sto-
chastic approaches to debt sustainability – Monte Carlo simulations and “fan charts” 
– proposed by Hoffmaister et al. (2001), Garcia and Rigobon (2004), Hostland and 
Karam (2006), Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006), and Tanner and Samake (2008).  
Under the simulated precautionary regime (PR), the initial primary surplus is 
modestly higher than under the alternatives, both tax rates and the debt ratio fall over 
time.  For  cases  where  the permanent  component  to  output  shocks  is i m portant, 
the precautionary regime provides a smoother path of taxes than under debt targeting.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the eco-
nomic environment. Section 3 discusses the loss function associated with tax smooth-
ing. Section 4 discusses some additional aspects of tax smoothing. Section 5 presents 
a debt targeting regime. Section 6 presents a precautionary regime. Section 7 presents 
simulations. Section 8 concludes.  
2. The Economic Environment 
In this paper, we will compare several alternative fiscal regimes. All share 
a common economic environment with three key elements: the output process, the go-
vernment’s intertemporal budget constraint, and the sequencing of fiscal policy de-
cisions in any period. 
The output process. Output Y, is the sum of permanent and transitory com-
ponents. It follows a “random-walk-plus-noise” model (see (Harvey, 1989; p. 102)): 
3 O ther  recent  work  on  fiscal  policy  that  features  a precautionary  element  includes  the International 
Monetary Fund’s (2003) stress test framework, Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodologies like that of Kopits and
Barnhill  (2003),  and  the discussion  of  the fiscal  authority’s  role  as  a “tormented  insurer”  found  in 
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                   Yt  = Yt
P + Ht                       (1a) 
                   Yt
P = Yt-1
P + Kt                              (1b) 
where Yt
P is permanent output. The permanent component is a random walk with 
shockKt. The transitory component Ht is pure noise. The shocks to the permanent and 
transitory component are uncorrelated at all leads and lags. The separate components 
are never observed. The “signal-to-noise” ratio q = var(Kt)/var(Ht) is assumed to be 
known. Only the sum of three elements (Yt-1
P + Ht Kt) is observed – not the indi-
vidual elements.  
In the well-known signal extraction problem, an economic agent attempts to 
distinguish permanent and temporary components. The recursive estimate of perma-
nent output at time t conditional on information available at time t-1, Ǔ
P
t|t-1, is: 
                  Ǔ
P
t|t-1 = (1-D) Ǔ
P
t-1|t-2  + DYt-1                     (1c) 
where D, derived from a least-squares optimization problem, is a function of the sig-




0.5] (see (Muth, 1960), (Harvey, 
1989), (Miniane, 2003)). Notice that information acquired in a period is only useful 
for forecasting in the following period.  
 
The government budget constraint. In any period, the government’s constraint 
in constant prices is:  
            Bt-1ҏ(1+r)PSt = Bt                                    (2) 
where B is real debt and PS is the real primary surplus (tax revenue T minus primary 
government expenditures G). As a ratio to output, the ex post budget constraint is: 
                bt-1Ttpst = bt                                 (3) 
where b is the ratio of government debt to output (Y), T is the ex post growth adjusted 
discount factor (1+r)/(1+O), Ot= (Yt/Yt-1 1) is the realized growth rate of real output, 
and pst is the primary surplus ratio to output. The intertemporal budget constraint is 
obtained by successive substitution of (1) over an infinite horizon: 
                                            f         f                          f 
                                b-16pst / 3Tt = lim bt  / 3T
t-1                                                         (4a) 
                                          t=0        t=0        tof       t=0   
 
The transversality (or “no-Ponzi game”) condition is:   
                                          lim bt/(1+r)
t-1 = 0                       (4b) 
                                          tof 
Equation (4b) says that the limiting discounted value of government liabilities 
cannot differ from zero.
4  
The sequence of fiscal policy decisions. Common to all regimes is an assumed 
sequence that reflects some important aspects of fiscal policymaking. In the initial 
4 Note that trend growth of output is assumed to be zero. The model can be modified to include a drift term 
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period (t = 1) the government inherits debt level B0. Likewise, the debt level Bt-1 is 
known at the beginning of every subsequent period. 
The government must make certain decisions at the beginning of each period 
(t = 1, 2, …) – before the output shocks are realized. We assume that governments 
control the level of spending. They make commitments at the beginning of the pe-
riod,  and  they  fulfill  their  commitments  through  the end  of  the period.  We  also 
assume that our government wishes to smooth its expenditures in the sense that it 
programs a constant proportion J of forecasted permanent output in period t condi-
tional on information in time t-1 (that is, before output is realized Ǔ
P
t|t-1). That is,  
                 Gt = JǓ
P
t|t-1                      (5) 
And,  at  the beginning  of  each  period  the government  also  chooses  the tax 
rateW which is levied on realized output Yt.
5 As discussed below, depending on which 
regime is chosen, W
i is chosen, where i designates the chosen regime. Typically, a re-
gime reflects some relationship between tax rate Wt
i, the fixed primary expenditure 
ratio J and interest payments rbt-1.  
3. Tax Smoothing (TS) under a Linear Quadratic Loss Function 
Ideally, fiscal regimes should reflect an underlying objective function. In this 
paper, the government’s objective is similar to one proposed by Barro (1979): the go-
vernment is assumed to minimize tax collection costs. Assuming exogenous values for 
the primary expenditure ratio J, the initial debt ratio b-1, and the real interest rate r, 
and the current period estimate of permanent output Ǔ
P
t|t-1, the government chooses 
a path of tax rates Wt that minimizes the discounted expected loss function: 
                                             f   
                                         6 Et)(Wt)/(1+M)
t                             (6) 
                                           t=0  
where Et is the conditional expectations operator and M is the government’s rate of 
time preference, subject to constraints (4a) and (4b) and the framework for expendi-
ture decisions (5). In this section, we consider a specific functional form, namely the li-
near quadratic form, similar to one found in Sargent’s (1987, pp. 385–88) extension 
of Barro’s model: 
                   )(Wt) = IWt
2                               (7) 
In this case, for M = r, the first order condition in any period t is 2IWt = Yt 
(Y = Lagrange multiplier), and thus the Euler equation implies that Wt = Et (Wt+1), t. 
In our  context,  the government  seeks  to maintain  a constant  expenditure  share  of 
permanent  output.  Thus,  substituting  the Euler  equation  into  ex a n te  budget  con-
straint (4a) yields the following policy rule: 
               Wt
TS = J + rbt-1
TS           (8) 
5 More precisely, since there is no time inconsistency in this model, optimization is assumed to take place
at t = 0; thereafter, the government simply executes decisions based on policy functions calculated at t = 0 
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t|t-1 is the debt level in the previous period scaled by 
expected  permanent output. (Equivalently,  the rule  says  that  the expected  primary 
surplus should be pst
TS = rBt-1/Ǔ
P
t|t-1). Ex post, the debt level Bt is: 




t|t-1–Yt]        (9) 
where <t  Ł Yt/Ǔ
P
t|t-1. And, the ex post debt ratio bt ( Ł Bt/Yt) evolves according to: 
           bt
TS = bt-1
TS(Yt-1/Yt)(1+r-r<t) + J[<t
-1 – 1]       (10) 
Thus, the tax smoothing framework reflects a standard logic: temporary chan-
ges in government spending are financed by temporary debt issue, while permanent 
spending changes are matched one to one with tax rate changes. Importantly, equ-
ations (9) and (10) reveal that if there are no errors in forecasting permanent output 
(< the debt ratio (relative to permanent output) is stabilized; this feature is wi-
dely recognized (see, for example (International Monetary Fund, 2003b)). The tax 
smoothing regime closely resembles the sustainability frameworks of Blanchard et al. 
(1990), Talvi and Végh (2000), and Burnside (2005). 
4. Does a Tax Smoothing Regime Stabilize the Debt? 
Equations (9) and (10) also reveal how debt fluctuations stem from errors in 
forecasting permanent output, in both ratio form <t and difference form [Ǔ
P
t|t-1–Yt].  
In this section, we discuss why it may be difficult to stabilize the debt under a tax 
smoothing regime.  
It has been well known since Barro (1979) and Sargent (1987) that both debt 
and  taxes  can  follow  random  walks.  However,  in  their  models,  the random  walk 
stems from the assumption that there are random shocks to expenditures  (that  is, 
wars). By contrast, we assume that the authority aims to keep the expenditure ratio 
constant.  
However, if there is a substantial permanent component to output shocks 
(var(K large relative to var(H)), debt and taxes may also drift substantially from their 
origin. Moreover, the random walk in the debt ratio (and implicitly, the tax rate) may 
contain an upward drift. This point may be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose 
that output follows a random walk (q = ), and that Y0 = 100. Assume also that both 
the tax rate and ex ante expenditure ratio are set at 20 % (W= J= 0.2), with no initial 
debt. At the beginning of period 1 – before that period’s shock – expected permanent 
output Ǔ
P
1|0 = 100. If expectations are correct, ex post Y
P
1 = 100 and the deficit equals 
zero – both as a level and as a ratio to permanent output Y
P. Alternatively, consider 
symmetric  shocks  of  ±5 units.  For  the pessimistic  case  Y
P
1 =  1 0 5 ,  t h e   surplus  as 
a ratio to output is 0.952 % ([21–20]/105). For  the optimistic  case Y
P
1 =  95, that 
(deficit) ratio is -1.053 % of output ([19–20]/95). Thus, the mean surplus ratio-to- 
-output is -0.033 % (deficit); the shocks do not exactly cancel out but instead exhibit 
a deficit bias. Alternatively, we may verify more formally that there is an upward 
drift to debt. First, rewrite (10) as:  
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Next, by appealing to Jensen’s Inequality, it can be shown that the two error 
terms (1-<t) and [<t
-1 – 1] may have positive (rather than zero) means.
6  
Seen either way, this result helps illustrate how the debt ratio might drift up-
wards under a TS regime – even if the policymaker does not intend it to do so. Simu-
lations (discussed below) will reveal that such an upward drift is more modest in 
cases where permanent shocks are relatively unimportant. But, such a drift is more 
apparent as permanent shocks become more important relative to temporary shocks 
(var(K) grows relative to var(H)).  
Even for the extreme case with only temporary shocks (var(K) = 0, var(H) >0), 
there will be ex ante permanent changes to the debt under this regime. To see this, 
note that an adverse shock in the initial period will cause a one-period deficit – and 
an increase in the debt. Since the expected value of all future shocks is zero, the debt 
has risen permanently ex ante. (Ex post, however, simulations of such a case yield 
debt outcomes that are distributed around the initial mean.) 
Also, under intermediate cases of (1a)–(1b) wherein both var(H) and var(K) are 
nonzero, under a TS regime, any shock – permanent or temporary – will cause per-
sistent build-ups / drawdowns of debt. Indeed, as simulations later in the paper show, 
debt levels at the end of J periods are more uncertain if there are both temporary and 
permanent shocks to output var(K, var(H) both nonzero than at either of the two polar 
extremes (var(K) = 0, or var(H) = 0). This happens because agents do not know whe-
ther a given shock is temporary or permanent until some time after the shock has 
occurred. 
To illustrate, assume that in period 1 the inherited debt stock is zero (b0 = 0) 
and permanent output, known before the first period shock, is Y
P
0. Assume also that 
the first period shock (the sum of the unobserved components) is adverse: error1 =  
= H+ K < 0.  Finally,  assume  that  after  period 1  there  are  no  additional  shocks 
(errort = 0, t = 2,3,4...). 
Consider now two polar cases of shocks that are fully permanent (error1 Ł K1) 
and  fully  temporary  (error1 Ł H1).  In  either  case,  the government  runs  a period 1 
deficit equal to J[Y
P
0 - Y1]. However, if the adverse shock is fully permanent (error1 Ł  




1 =  
= K1(1-D) > 0. Since the estimate of permanent output in successive periods is a re-
cursion,  the error  will  persist  and  die  out  gradually.  Accordingly,  in  subsequent 




t] – a persistent 
deficit and a permanent accumulation of debt. 
By contrast, if the adverse shock is fully temporary (error1 Ł H1), permanent 




1 = -DH1 < 0. Again, 
noting the recursive nature of permanent output forecasts, the underestimate will die 
out  only  gradually.  Accordingly,  in  the subsequent  periods,  the government  will 




t] – a persistent surplus/debt drawdown. 




t|t-1. Next, we define Zt  Ł [Ǔ
P
t|t-1 -Yt], where E(Z) = 0, and 
f(Z) =  Z/Ǔ
P.  Since  the partial  derivatives  are  Z/Ǔ




P2 =  2 ( Ǔ
P)
-3 > 0,  f(Z)  is  a con-
vex function. Consistent with Jensen’s Inequality, if f(Z) is convex, E(f(Z))  f(E(Z)) and, since f(E(Z)) = 0, 
E(f(Z))  0. A symmetric proof holds for [<t
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The potential for large and permanent shifts in debt levels, even when policy 
makers  are  well-intentioned,  brings  to  mind  the “debt  intolerance”  suggested  by 
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). Large and permanent shifts to debt levels 
will require large adjustments. Markets may have difficulties distinguishing perma-
nent from temporary shocks to government debt. Moreover, markets may doubt that 
the required adjustment will take place. In these cases, a crisis of “debt intolerance” 
may take place – even at relatively low levels of debt. 
The question arises as to whether the government could have other mecha-
nisms besides distortionary taxation for dealing with uncertainty. In the optimal fiscal 
policy literature, some (Lucas, Stokey, 1983) have suggested that the public sector 
could issue state-contingent assets. However, such contingencies on debt need not be 
explicitly  specified.  Instead,  according  to  the fiscal  theory  of  the price  level,  un-
anticipated inflations will do the job under a “non-Ricardian” regime – one in which 
the government  does  not  explicitly a djust  the primary  surplus  (Cochrane,  1998), 
(Woodford, 2001), (Chari, Christiano, Kehoe, 1994), and (Hall, Krieger, 2002). 
Real-world examples of explicit state-contingent government debt are rarely 
found. And, neither explicit default nor unanticipated inflation appears to be widely 
embraced as optimal policy in the real world. Rather, most governments would like 
to avoid such events.  
Several kinds of market imperfections may help to explain this  disconnect 
between theory and reality. First, there may be important informational asymmetries 
(including moral hazard) in the conduct of fiscal policy: the government itself has 
control over spending levels. Second, in a model with predetermined prices, state- 
-contingent inflationary pressures will cause misallocations of resources whose wel-
fare costs may exceed the benefits arising from an inflationary shock absorber (Siu, 
2004), (Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, 2002), (Angeletos, 2003). Third, certain features of fi-
nancial markets may make state-contingent inflation an undesirable way to balance 
the budget. For example, some have argued that safe public debt serves an important 
comparator benchmark role. For such debt to be marketable, its return should be safe 
from credit risk. (For further discussion of these issues, see (Kumhof, Tanner, 2005.)) 
5. A Debt Targeting (DT) Regime 
To address the potentially large and unpredictable fluctuations in debt under 
the TS regime, we next consider an (ad hoc) debt targeting regime (DT). Under this 
regime, taxes are determined by: 
  Wt










* is the (ad hoc) target debt (assumed to be equal to 
the initial debt level b0) and D is the adjustment coefficient implied by the signal ex-
traction model: the authority only responds to permanent deviations from the debt 
target. 
This regime resembles some fiscal rules currently in place. An example would 
be the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP calls for a long- 
-run debt ceiling to output ratio in member countries not to exceed 60 percent of out-
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The key advantage of this regime is that it helps prevent the wide swings in 
debt that might occur over time under a tax-smoothing regime. That is, looking J pe-
riods ahead, the authority will have a better idea what the end-period debt ratio bJ 
will be under the DT regime than under the TS regime. 
However, this regime also has a clear drawback: it implies more volatile tax 
rates – fiscal adjustments that are more frequent and deeper than under TS. Such 
a policy inhibits countercyclical borrowing insofar as it may require adjustments du-
ring a recession. Also, spreading out the adjustment over time more gradually – sett-
ing the adjustment coefficient in (12) to some number less than D – would simply 
increase the permanent accumulation of debt.  
6. A Precautionary (PR) Fiscal Regime 
In this section, we consider a third regime that is designed to guard against 
future tax and debt increases. In doing so, we rephrase the government’s objective 
function:  the fiscal  authority  targets  a primary  surplus  today  with  the aim  of  pre-
cluding future fiscal adjustments for all but the most unfavorable z-percent of macro-
economic circumstances (where z is some “small” number – presumably less than 
50 percent). 
In recent years, policy has been increasingly cast in such terms. For example, 
the IMF (2003) has recently developed a “stress test” approach under which the au-
thority aims for a primary surplus that is expected to stabilize (or reduce) the debt. 
Under this approach, scenarios are presented in which key variables (including growth 
and interest rates) are assumed to deviate from their baseline value by two standard 
deviations. 
In a similar vein, Kopits and Barnhill (2003) suggest using a value-at-risk (VaR) 
methodology to fiscal sustainability. In such an approach, the government estimates 
both the mean and the variance of relevant fiscal variables. Likewise, Mendoza and 
Oviedo (2004) emphasize the role of the fiscal authority as a “tormented insurer.” 
Under their approach, as the variability of fiscal shocks rises, the country’s maximum 
sustainable debt ratio falls.  
Such an objective function relates to recent stochastic simulations of debt sus-
tainability – including “fan charts” – proposed by Hoffmaister et al. (2001), Garcia 
and Rigobon (2004), Hostland and Karam (2006), Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006), 
and Tanner and Samake (2008). In their frameworks, substantial increases in public 
debt become increasingly likely over time, even when the fiscal stance remains un-
changed. This must be so: the forecast variance of debt increases with horizon length. 
These approaches plainly reveal the probability of undesirable outcomes – essentially 
the upper tails of the “fan chart.” Our objective function helps recast such simula-
tions in a normative light: it summarizes the maximum fiscal adjustment that a coun-
try is willing to suffer in order to avoid further increases in debt (in probability terms, 
over a given horizon).  
If the government aims to avoid further adjustment with a probability of less 
than 50 percent, it will also, on average, reduce the debt. This is because, under such 
a regime, the primary surplus must exceed that prescribed by the TS regime, by some 
factor that is linked to the variability of the tax burden. (Formally, the tax burden is 
all expenditures rb + JHowever, in our model, the major source of tax burden va-Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 11-12                                      511 
riability comes from the debt b, since the primary expenditure ratio J remains con-
stant.) 
We assume a linear relationship between the debt/output ratio and the standard 
deviation of the tax burden by the coefficient ZThat is, the variability of the tax bur-
den is Zb. A priori, such an assumption makes sense, since the only other source of 
variance would be the primary expenditure ratio J – a variable that we have assumed 
that the government maintains ex ante constant. However, this assumption is also 
borne out by simulations (discussed below). 
Thus, under a precautionary regime, tax rates are determined according to: 
 Wt
PR = J + (r + NZbt-1
PR






t|t-1. As a formal matter, the objective function underlying (13) 
cannot b e  linear  quadratic.  As  the literature  on  precautionary  savings  (Kimball, 
1990), (Carroll, Kimball, 1996), (Caballero, 1990) emphasizes, such a precautionary 
element like that found in (13) requires that the government’s objective function also 
has a nonzero third moment.  
At the same time, it is difficult to link regime (13) to a specific functional 
form in a way that is consistent with the linear, least-squares forecasting problem 
implied by equations (1a)–(1b). As Sargent (1987, p. 396) explains, under quadratic 
objective functions, linear forecasts can be derived separately from the optimization 
problem. This property – widely known as “certainty equivalence” – does not gene-
ralize to objective functions with higher-level moments. That is, while the first order 
condition implied by quadratic function (7) will include linear forecasts of future 
marginal tax collection costs; the first order condition implied by objective functions 
with a third moment will include nonlinear marginal collection costs.  
Most  noncertainty  equivalent  models  are  technically  complex.  We c o nfine 
ourselves here to a special case that can motivate policy rules with a precautionary 
element. Thus, consider the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)/exponential loss 
function:  
                           )(Wt) = -1/Iexp(-IWt)         (14) 
By analogy with Caballero’s (1990) work on household consumption, this 
functional form has an important implication: it yields an expression for the optimal 
tax rate that is contingent on expenditures, debt, and volatility.
7 Such an analogy is 
straightforward if there is no signal extraction problem (the polar cases q =  and 
q = 0 in (1a)–(1b) that are equivalent to ones explicitly considered by Caballero). In 
other cases, such a functional form is better thought of as a heuristic device.
8  
Note that, so long as I is nonzero, the function has a nonzero third derivative, 
which gives rise to a precautionary motive for household saving – a positive rela-
tionship between saving and the variance of the driving process. Moreover, the ratio 
7 T his  functional  form  is  not  necessary  to  obtain  precautionary  behavior,  but  it  does  yield  an exact 
solution. Talmain (1998) provides approximations for other functional forms.  
8 Caballero considered several cases of a single shock to labor output, including random walk (q =  in our 
model) and white noise (q = 0). However, the nonpolar cases of (1a)–(1b) involve two separate shocks –
ones that agents are unable to contemporaneously distinguish.  512                               Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 11-12 
)ccc)ccis said to be a measure of “prudence” (Kimball, 1990).
9  Not e next that 
the Euler equation for any two periods t (Wknown) and t + 1 (W unknown) is:  
            exp(-IWt)/E[exp(-IWt+1)] = (1+M)/(1+r)                                (15) 
Then, following Caballero (1990), it can be shown that if output variance is 
normally distributed, Euler equation (15) implies that the nonstochastic component to 
tax rates is: 
                 Wt = Wt-1 + IVt
2/2           (16) 
where V
2 is the variance of the total tax burden (discussed below).
10  Thus, the case of 
I 0 is equivalent to the tax smoothing regime discussed in the previous section. By 
contrast, if I< 0fiscal policy may be said to have a precautionary element, insofar 
as the authority attempts to avoid future adjustments by raising today’s primary sur-
plus beyond the minimum required to keep the (expected) debt ratio constant.  
Note also that substituting (16) into the budget constraint (4) and t he trans-
versality condition (5) yields a long-run (expected) relationship between tax rates, 
expenditure, and debt:  
               Wt
* = Nt





2/2.  By  assumption,  Nt
* i s  t i me-varying:  the variance  of 
the tax burden (J + rb) falls as the debt ratio itself falls.  
The prudence parameter -Ihas an alternative, common-sense interpretation, 
consistent with the value-at-risk approach: it summarizes the willingness to pay for 
a precautionary cushion. If -I equals or exceeds some critical value -I(z), 0 < z < 1, 
the government will be willing to levy taxes today sufficient to “cover itself” with pro- 
9 A lternatively,  the statistical  term  for  the third  moment,  namely  skewness,  helps  illustrate  the nature 
of the preference  function:  the authority  places  an extra  weight  on  the unattractive  prospect  of  raising 
taxes. 
10 The following informal argument will show that, if I < 0, there will be a positive relationship between 
volatility and the optimal tax rate. First, repeating for convenience expression (15), the Euler equation for 
any two periods t (W known) and t+1 (W unknown) is:  
 
   e x p ( - IWt)/E[exp(-IWt+1)] = (1+M)/(1+r) 
 
In steady state (r = M), taking the natural logarithm of (15) yields: 
 
   ln{exp(-IWt)} = ln{E[exp(-IWt+1)]} 
 
Following Caballero (1990), we conjecture that the future tax rate Wt+1 contains two components: a constant 
one  (Wt+1
*)  and  a variable  one  (Qt+1).  Then,  note  that  E (Qt+1) = 0.  The corresponding  marginal  loss 
associated with E (Qt+1) is:  
              Ic(0) = exp(-I*0) = 1 
 
The natural logarithm of the above term is ln(Ic(0)) = ln(exp(-I*0)) = 0. By Jensen’s inequality, since 
E (ln(X)) < ln (E(X)), E (ln(exp(-IQt+1)) must be less than zero. If Euler equation (15) is re-written as:  
 
Ic(Wt) = E (Ic(Wt+1
*)) + E (Ic(Qt+1)) 
 
it is easily seen that the marginal losses behave according to Ic(Wt) < E (Ic(Wt+1
*)) (since E (Ic(Qt+1)) < 0). 
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bability (1–z).
11 Thus, the critical value of -I (z) tells us the minimum “prudence” 
required for a government to choose to run a primary surplus sufficient to avoid 
further adjustment for all but the worst z percent of state contingencies. 
7. Simulation Results 
This section presents simulations of regimes TS, DT, and PR for alternative 
parameter values.
12 Repeated J period histories are drawn, for both short and long 
horizons, J = 20 and 100. In all cases, 1000 simulations are computed.  
Key parameters were chosen to conform broadly to emerging markets. How-
ever,  alternative  assumptions  for  variances  and  interest  rates, n o t  p r e s e n ted  here, 
yield qualitatively similar results. In all cases, the standard deviation of total output 
(permanent and temporary components combined, var(H+K)) is assumed to be 2.5. 
For each simulation, several alternative values for the signal-to-noise ratio (q) are 
presented – see Table 1.
13 
Periods are thought of as “quarters”. Output in the initial quarter is 100, initial 
debt is 200 (50 percent of yearly output); the primary expenditure ratio J = 20 per-
cent.  The interest  rate  is  assumed  to  be  2 percent  (about  8 percent  yearly).  Thus, 
the mean tax rates under TS and DT W = 24 percent; under perfect certainty, the debt 
stabilizing primary surplus is 4 percent of yearly output.  
Under the precautionary regime PR the initial tax rate  W0 is assum ed to be 
24.5 percent; this is ½ percent of output greater than W0 under TS/DT. This “front- 
-loaded” adjustment keeps the debt from rising in all but the worst 15–20 percent of 
cases, depending on the value of q. 
7.1 The Behavior of Debt across Regimes 
While the debt ratio b is typically most interesting for policymakers, looking 
at the debt level BT reveals some effects of the chosen fiscal policy itself – as opposed 




(temporary)  q  Į
6.25  0.00    1.00 
5.47  0.78  7.00  0.88 
4.69  1.56  3.00  0.79 
3.13  3.13  1.00  0.62 
1.56  4.69  0.33  0.43 
0.78  5.47  0.14  0.31 
0.00  6.25  0.00  0.00 
 
11 Thus, assuming that shocks are distributed normally, choice of z % corresponds to k(ztimesV (k(0.5) =
= 1.64, k(0.1) = 1.3, k(0.15) = 1.04, etc.). And, I = -2/V [k(z)]. 
12 All simulations are performed in RATS. 
13 A referee correctly points out that, in the strict sense, the variance pairs in Table 1 do not keep total 




t-1 + Kt, where U <1. Thus, var(Y
P) =
= var(K)/(1-U
2): the variance of Y
P does not move one-to-one with the variance of K. As a remedy, we per-
formed  two  supplemental  sets  of  simulations.  One  set  of  simulations  considers  alternative  values  of 
var(K) for a fixed value var(H) = 3.13. The other set considers alternative values of var(H) for a fixed value 
of var(K) = 3.13. Results, available from the authors, largely confirm the analysis in the body of the paper.  514                               Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 11-12 
 
to effects due to changes in the scale variable Y. Thus, Tables 2 and 3 summarize 
selected  properties  of  both  the debt  ratio (b)  and  the debt  level (B)  at  the end  of 
J periods (J = 20, 100), for 1000 simulations of regimes TS, DS, and PR. The table 
reports the mean, the standard deviation, and values for the 75
th and 90
th percentiles. 
These latter statistics are consistent with value at risk (VaR) approaches (for example 
(Kopits, Barnhill, 2003)): they tell us that the debt (ratio or level) exceeds the critical 
value in 25 or 10 percent of the simulations. 
Results reveal that, under a tax smoothing (TS) regime, for the cases where 
permanent  shocks  are  more  important  (higher q)  it  is  more  difficult  to  stabilize 
the debt ratio. For both horizons J = 20 and J = 100, the increase in the mean debt 
ratio (previously discussed) is evident. As q increases, so does the increase in mean 
debt bJ. And, the standard deviation of the terminal debt ratio bJ increases mono-
tonically with q. Likewise, as q rises so do the 75
th and 90
th percentile statistics.  
Hence, for more permanent shocks (higher q), debt increases are more severe 
in the worst 25 and 20 percent of cases. As Table 2 shows, for a twenty-period horizon 
(J = 20, about five years), if all shocks are permanent (infinite q), the terminal value of 
the debt ratio b20 equals or exceeds 55 percent of output in 25 percent (75
th percentile 
statistic) and 59 percent of output in 10 percent (90
th percentile statistic).  
TABLE 2  Selected Statistics, Simulated Debt Ratios (bJ), and Levels (BJ)  
after 20 Periods (J=20); (SD = standard deviation) 
Debt Ratio (b20) Debt Level (B20)








qĺ, Į = 1  TS  0.51  0.07  0.55  0.59  200.0  2.7  201.9  203.5 
  DT  0.50  0.00  0.50  0.50  200.0  22.6  215.4  228.9 
  TP  0.48  0.06  0.52  0.57  190.3  2.7  192.1  193.7 
q = 8,ҏ Į = 0.88  TS  0.50  0.06  0.54  0.59  199.9  2.8  201.7  203.5 
  DT  0.50  0.00  0.50  0.51  200.7  20.7  215.3  227.0 
  TP  0.48  0.06  0.51  0.56  190.2  2.8  192.0  193.8 
q = 3, Į = 0.79  TS  0.51  0.06  0.54  0.59  200.0  2.9  202.0  204.0 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.50  0.51  199.8  18.9  212.4  223.7 
  TP  0.48  0.06  0.51  0.56  190.3  2.9  192.3  194.3 
q =1, Į = 0.62  TS  0.50  0.05  0.53  0.57  200.0  3.0  202.0  204.0 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.51  0.51  199.8  14.9  210.0  218.4 
  TP  0.48  0.05  0.51  0.54  190.3  3.0  192.3  194.2 
q = 0.33,ҏ Į = 0.43  TS  0.50  0.04  0.53  0.55  200.0  3.0  202.0  204.1 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.51  0.52  200.0  9.8  207.1  212.5 
  TP  0.48  0.04  0.50  0.53  190.3  2.9  192.3  194.3 
q = 0.14, Į = 0.31  TS  0.50  0.03  0.52  0.54  199.9  2.9  201.9  203.6 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.51  0.52  200.1  6.4  204.7  208.3 
  TP  0.48  0.03  0.49  0.51  190.2  2.9  192.2  193.9 
q = 0, Į = 0  TS  0.50  0.02  0.51  0.52  199.9  2.7  201.6  203.3 
  DT  0.50  0.02  0.51  0.52  199.9  2.7  201.6  203.3 
  TP  0.48  0.02  0.49  0.50  190.2  2.6  191.9  193.5 
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Likewise, as Table 3 shows, the corresponding statistic for a 100 period hori-
zon (J = 100, about 25 years), the terminal value of the debt ratio b100 equals or ex-
ceeds 62 percent of output in 25 percent of cases (75
th percentile); b100 equals or 
exceeds 76 percent of output in 10 percent of cases (90
th percentile.)  
Interestingly, the unscaled debt levels BJ reveal a nonmonotonic relationship 
between  q a nd  the volatility  of  BJ.  The relationship  has  an “inverse  U”  shape: 
the standard  deviation  of  end-period  debt  BJ a nd  its  75
th a nd  90
th p ercentiles  are 
highest at intermediate values of q (specifically q § 0.33) – cases with both tempo-
rary and permanent shocks. This result reflects the fact that (as discussed previously) 
persistent shocks to debt take place in a TS regime precisely because agents do not 
initially know whether a given shock is temporary or permanent.  
Simulations also reveal that the debt targeting (DT) regime achieves its goal. 
In all cases, the standard deviations of debt ratios bJ (but not levels BJ) fall drama-
tically, as do the 75
th and 90
th percentiles. (As previously mentioned, for q = 0, TS 
and DT are equivalent.)  
And, the precautionary regime (PR) reduces the mean debt level  and ratios 
relative to both TS and DT as expected. As Table 2 shows, after 20 periods, the mean 
debt ratio b20 drops from its initial value of 50 percent of output to about 48 percent. 
TABLE 3  Selected Statistics, Simulated Debt Ratios (bJ), and Levels (BJ)  
after 100 Periods (J=100) (SD = standard deviation) 
Debt Ratio (b100) Debt Level (B100)









qĺ, Į = 1  TS  0.55  0.24  0.62  0.76  200.0  6.0  204.2  207.7 
  DT  0.50  0.00  0.50  0.50  200.0  50.0  234.6  264.9 
  TP  0.43  0.19  0.49  0.60  155.9  5.4  159.7  162.6 
q = 8, Į = 0.88  TS  0.55  0.20  0.62  0.77  200.4  6.5  204.2  207.7 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.50  0.51  197.2  47.2  229.8  258.3 
  TP  0.43  0.16  0.49  0.61  156.2  5.7  160.0  163.8 
q = 3, Į = 0.79  TS  0.52  0.14  0.58  0.70  199.4  6.5  203.7  207.7 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.50  0.51  203.9  43.0  233.2  260.5 
  TP  0.40  0.11  0.46  0.54  155.4  5.8  159.1  162.8 
q = 1, Į = 0.62  TS  0.52  0.12  0.58  0.66  199.8  6.7  204.6  208.2 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.51  0.52  201.2  34.1  224.6  245.0 
  TP  0.40  0.09  0.45  0.52  155.6  5.9  160.0  163.1 
q = 0.33, Į = 0.43  TS  0.51  0.09  0.56  0.62  199.8  6.8  204.3  208.3 
  DT  0.50  0.01  0.51  0.52  200.8  24.3  216.7  231.9 
  TP  0.40  0.07  0.44  0.48  155.7  6.0  159.7  163.3 
q = 0.14, Į = 0.31  TS  0.51  0.07  0.55  0.59  200.3  6.8  204.8  209.0 
  DT  0.50  0.02  0.51  0.52  199.3  17.3  211.4  221.1 
  TP  0.40  0.05  0.43  0.47  156.1  6.0  160.1  163.8 
q = 0, Į = 0  TS  0.50  0.02  0.51  0.53  200.3  6.1  204.3  207.6 
  DT  0.50  0.02  0.51  0.53  200.3  6.1  204.3  207.6 
  TP  0.39  0.02  0.40  0.41  156.1  5.4  159.6  162.6 
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Moreover, as Table 3 shows, after one hundred periods, the mean debt ratio b100 
drops further still to about 43 percent. 
And, PR provides less debt volatility relative to TS (but not DT). 
However, for cases where permanent shocks are more important (higher q), 
the precautionary regime PR implies a relatively larger “cushion.” Hence, for the 20- 
-period simulation (Table 2), under the PR regime, the 75
th and 90
th percentiles for bJ 
are 52 percent and 57 percent of output respectively (as opposed to 55 percent and 
59 percent of output under the TS regime). Likewise, for the 100-period simulation 
(Table 3), under the PR regime, the 75
th and 90
th percentiles for by are 49 percent and 
60 percent respectively (as opposed to 62 percent and 76 percent under the TS re-
gime). 
7.2 The Behavior of Tax Rates across Regimes 
As discussed above, tax rates, rather than debt ratios, directly impact the ci-
tizens of a country. Collection cost functions (7) and (14) are meant to reflect the dis-
tortionary impacts of taxes. Thus, we also examine the behavior of the tax rate W. 
How do tax rates behave under the alternative regimes? Does the debt targeting (DT) 
regime represent an attractive policy option? Accordingly, simulated data on tax rates 
are presented both graphically and in tables.  
As mentioned previously, the initial tax rateW0 is about 24 percent under TS 
and DT but 24.5 percent under PR. Note that under PR (and unlike TS or DT) taxes 
fall over time. As Table 4 shows, after 20 periods, under regime PR, the tax rateWJ 
falls to about 24.3 percent; after 100 periods, W100 falls slightly below the tax rates 
implied by TS or DT. 
Average simulated tax rates for regimes TS, DT, and PR (taken over 1000 
draws) are graphed in Figures 1a–1g (at the end of this section) for alternative values 
of q.  Casual  observation  reveals  that  for  high  values  of q  (for  example  q=,  Fi-
gure 1a) the TS regime yields a tax rate that rises gradually over time. Under the DT 
regime, taxes are more volatile but do not appear to drift upwards. And, under the PR 
regime, tax rates are initially higher than under DT or PR but fall over time. How-
ever, as q falls, the upward drift under TS becomes less pronounced; for the case of 
q = 0 (Figure 1g), the tax rate under TS appears to be roughly constant over time. 
Also, as q falls, the behavior of DT gradually becomes more similar to that of TS; for 
the case of q = 0 (Figure 1g), TS and DT are identical.  
To supplement the graphs, Tables 4 and 5 present the mean, standard devia-
tion, 75
th, and 90
th percentiles of within-period and end-period tax rates (Wj, and WJ 
respectively) for 20 and 100 period horizons, respectively. 
According to these tables, for cases where permanent shocks are more impor-
tant (high q), the TS regime is a relatively less effective policy for stabilizing tax 
rates. Instead, tax rate variability and q are positively related. Thus, at the end of 
a 20-year horizon (J = 20), if all shocks are permanent (q = ), there is a 25  percent 
chance (75
th percentile statistic) that the tax rate W20 will be at least 24.4 percent; for 
the worst 10 percent of cases (90
th percentile statistic), the tax rate W20 will be at least 
24.7 percent. Likewise, after 100 periods (J = 100), if all shocks are permanent (q = 
= ), there is a 25percent chance (75
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at least 24.9 percent; for the worst 10 percent of cases (90
th percentile statistic), tax 
rates W100 will be at least 26.1 percent. 
Tables 4 and 5 thus confirm an unattractive aspect of a debt targeting DT re-
gime: taxes are, by definition, made more volatile – perhaps unacceptably so. For 
q = , under a DT regime, the standard deviations for end-period taxes W20 and W100 
are substantially higher than under a TS regime. At the end of a 20-period horizon 
(J = 20), if all shocks are permanent (q = ), there is a 25percent chance (75
th per-
centile statistic) that the tax rate W20 will be at least 27.6 percent; for the worst 10 per-
cent of cases (90
th percentile statistic), the tax rate W20 will be at least 30.0 percent. 
A 100-period horizon (J = 100) yields similar results. Thus, a DT regime does stabi-
lize the debt, but with substantially more tax rate variability.  
By contrast, under the precautionary (PR) regime, simulations reveal that its 
initially higher tax rates yield some advantages. First, over the short term (J = 20), 
these advantages are more evident for higher values of q. For example, if all shocks 
are permanent (q = ), during periods t = 1 through J, the standard deviations of tax 
rates under TS and PR are about the same (0.002) – and substantially lower than 
under DT (0.05). Since the mean tax rate under PR is higher than under TS, so too 
are the 75
th and 90
th percentile statistics. Thus, the PR regime might be thought of as 
TABLE 4  Selected Statistics, Simulated Tax Rates, Within Period (ĲJ, j = 1 to J),  
and End-Period (ĲJ), 20 Periods (J = 20) (SD = standard deviation) 
Within-Period Tax Rate 
Ĳj,j   = 1 to 20  End-Period Tax Rate Ĳ20








qĺ, Į = 1  TS  0.240  0.002  0.242  0.243  0.241  0.005  0.244  0.247 
  DT  0.241  0.050  0.273  0.300  0.243  0.052  0.276  0.307 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.246  0.247  0.244  0.006  0.247  0.251 
q = 8,ҏ Į = 0.88  TS  0.240  0.002  0.241  0.242  0.240  0.005  0.243  0.247 
  DT  0.241  0.041  0.267  0.290  0.242  0.044  0.270  0.300 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.246  0.247  0.243  0.005  0.246  0.250 
q = 3, Į = 0.79  TS  0.240  0.002  0.241  0.242  0.240  0.005  0.243  0.247 
  DT  0.241  0.035  0.264  0.283  0.243  0.037  0.267  0.291 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.246  0.247  0.243  0.005  0.246  0.250 
q = 1, Į = 0.62  TS  0.240  0.001  0.241  0.242  0.240  0.004  0.243  0.245 
  DT  0.241  0.024  0.256  0.270  0.239  0.025  0.256  0.271 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.245  0.246  0.243  0.004  0.246  0.249 
q = 0.33,ҏ Į = 0.43  TS  0.240  0.001  0.241  0.241  0.240  0.003  0.242  0.244 
  DT  0.241  0.014  0.249  0.258  0.241  0.016  0.251  0.263 
  TP  0.244  0.001  0.245  0.246  0.243  0.003  0.245  0.247 
q = 0.14, Į = 0.31  TS  0.240  0.001  0.241  0.241  0.240  0.002  0.241  0.243 
  DT  0.240  0.008  0.246  0.250  0.240  0.011  0.247  0.254 
  TP  0.244  0.001  0.245  0.245  0.243  0.002  0.244  0.246 
q = 0, Į = 0  TS  0.240  0.000  0.240  0.240  0.240  0.001  0.240  0.241 
  DT  0.240  0.000  0.240  0.240  0.240  0.001  0.240  0.241 
  TP  0.244  0.001  0.244  0.245  0.243  0.001  0.243  0.244 
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a compromise  between  the TS  and  DT  regimes:  it  helps  attenuate  debt  volatility 
while avoiding additional tax rate volatility.  
Second, if the authority keeps with a PR regime, both the mean and the va-
riability of tax rates will fall. For a 100-period horizon (J = 100), the within period 
mean tax rate for PR is about the same or slightly less than under TS/DT; for cases in 
which the permanent shock is important (q  8), the standard deviation, the 75
th, and 
the 90
th percentile statistics are about the same under PR and TS. Thus, as before, PR 
appears  to  be  even  more  appealing  relative  to  TS  when  the shocks  are  mainly 
permanent: it is more urgent for policymakers to insure against permanent adverse 
shocks than temporary adverse shocks. 
Finally,  the simulations  reveal  the benefits  of  debt  reduction  over  the long 
term – for any value of q. At the end of a 100-period horizon (J = 100) the mean end- 
-period tax rate WJ  under PR is less than under TS/DT; as well, the standard deviation, 
75
th, and 90
th percentile statistics are all less under PR than either TS or DT for all 
values of q. 
TABLE 5  Selected Statistic, Simulated Tax Rates, Within Period (Ĳj, j = 1 to J),  
and End-Period (ĲJ), 100 Periods (J = 100)  (SD=standard deviation) 
Within-Period Tax Rate 
Ĳj, j =1 to 20  End-Period Tax Rate Ĳ20








qĺ, Į = 1  TS  0.240  0.002  0.242  0.243  0.241  0.005  0.244  0.247 
  DT  0.241  0.050  0.273  0.300  0.243  0.052  0.276  0.307 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.246  0.247  0.244  0.006  0.247  0.251 
q = 8,ҏ Į = 0.88  TS  0.240  0.002  0.241  0.242  0.240  0.005  0.243  0.247 
  DT  0.241  0.041  0.267  0.290  0.242  0.044  0.270  0.300 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.246  0.247  0.243  0.005  0.246  0.250 
q = 3, Į = 0.79  TS  0.240  0.002  0.241  0.242  0.240  0.005  0.243  0.247 
  DT  0.241  0.035  0.264  0.283  0.243  0.037  0.267  0.291 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.246  0.247  0.243  0.005  0.246  0.250 
q = 1, Į = 0.62  TS  0.240  0.001  0.241  0.242  0.240  0.004  0.243  0.245 
  DT  0.241  0.024  0.256  0.270  0.239  0.025  0.256  0.271 
  TP  0.244  0.002  0.245  0.246  0.243  0.004  0.246  0.249 
q = 0.33,ҏ Į = 0.43 TS  0.240  0.001  0.241  0.241  0.240  0.003  0.242  0.244 
  DT  0.241  0.014  0.249  0.258  0.241  0.016  0.251  0.263 
  TP  0.244  0.001  0.245  0.246  0.243  0.003  0.245  0.247 
q = 0.14, Į = 0.31 TS  0.240  0.001  0.241  0.241  0.240  0.002  0.241  0.243 
  DT  0.240  0.008  0.246  0.250  0.240  0.011  0.247  0.254 
  TP  0.244  0.001  0.245  0.245  0.243  0.002  0.244  0.246 
q = 0, Į = 0  TS  0.240  0.000  0.240  0.240  0.240  0.001  0.240  0.241 
  DT  0.240  0.000  0.240  0.240  0.240  0.001  0.240  0.241 
  TP  0.244  0.001  0.244  0.245  0.243  0.001  0.243  0.244 
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FIGURES 1a–g  Simulated Tax Rates, Regimes TS, DT, and PR 
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8. Conclusions 
Tax smoothing is a canonical framework for well-intentioned fiscal policy. 
Under certainty, tax smoothing implies a constant debt-to-output ratio. Accordingly, 
such a policy does not favor the present over the future – or vice versa. 
However, policymakers typically face uncertainty and they are often unsure 
about the true value of permanent output. Our analysis has illustrated the ways that 
tax smoothing can be perilous in such an environment: both debt levels and tax rates 
are difficult to stabilize and may drift upwards.  
One practical remedy would be to target the debt. However, our simulations 
confirmed the undesirable nature of such a policy: it increases tax rate volatility over 
time and may inhibit countercyclical borrowing. 
As an alternative we consider a precautionary regime. Unlike tax smoothing, 
which links the primary surplus to the debt ratio, a precautionary regime also links 
the optimal primary surplus to the volatility of the debt ratio.  
Over time, a precautionary regime will reduce the debt. Plans to reduce go-
vernment debt are not novel. However, the choice of any particular debt target is 
arbitrary and may be difficult to defend. In this sense, the credibility of government 
policy may be bolstered by an explicitly articulated objective function. Accordingly, 
under a precautionary regime, the objective is to guard against future tax and debt in-
creases for all but the worst macroeconomic circumstances. By contrast, tax smooth-
ing provides no such safeguard. In this sense, the ultimate goal of this paper is to 
foster good, clear, and understandable fiscal policies – echoing Lucas (1976) and 
Kydland and Prescott (1977).  
In this spirit, Tanner and Samake (2008) incorporate an objective function si-
milar to the one considered in this paper into a stochastic simulation of debt out-
comes in three emerging market economies, namely Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey.  522                               Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 58, 2008, no. 11-12 
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